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Abstract 
 
By applying event history analysis to a unique large sample of more than 300 government affairs 
managers working for companies active in the European Union, this article investigates whether 
managers with work experience in the public or non-profit sector are more likely to progress in 
their career in their current company and whether career progression depends on when that 
experience takes place. The findings suggest that managers with experience in the public and non-
profit sector are less likely to progress in their careers. This effect becomes stronger when the stage 
of the career at which the manager had experience in the public sector is taken into consideration. 
These findings are contrary to the expectations from the public and private management literature 
and suggest that we should see less revolving door activity in Brussels. We propose that these 
findings are driven by the distinct European Union public policy process and the variance in 
individual and organizational incentives in the EU public sector.  
Keywords: career, government affairs, European Union, lobbying 
Introduction 
The literature on public management pays great attention to sector switching (Bozeman & 
Ponomariov, 2009; Su & Bozeman, 2009) and its effects on career progression (Bozeman & 
2 
 
Ponomariov, 2009). By building on the assumption that only highly qualified and motivated 
individuals switch sectors (Bozeman & Ponomariov, 2009; Feeney & Boardman, 2011), recent 
research shows that public managers with work experience in the private sector are more likely to 
advance in their careers and receive more responsibility. In other words, a private sector premium 
is in place in the public sector (Bozeman & Ponomariov, 2009). The public management literature 
also finds that this private sector premium is stronger when the work experience in the private 
sector is in the earlier stages of the manager’s career. The reason is that time is needed in order for 
the manager to adapt his/her skills to the public sector (Bozeman & Ponomariov, 2009). For its 
part, the private management literature looks more generally at job mobility, finding that external 
mobility, namely having work experience outside the current company, positively affects 
managers’ careers in private companies (Lam, Ng, & Feldman, 2012). Close in spirit to the public 
management strand, Lam et al. (2012) also find that mobility has positive effects only when it 
takes place at early career stages.  
By applying event history analysis to a sample of more than 300 government affairs managers 
working for companies active in the European Union, this article investigates whether managers 
with work experience in the public or non-profit sector are more likely to progress in their career 
in their current company and whether career progression depends on when that experience takes 
place. Not only does this sample allow us to control for factors such as the type of job (as the 
analysis focuses on individuals with similar roles), but it also represents a particularly interesting 
case to study the interaction between the public and the private sector. Indeed, government affairs 
managers represent a ‘most likely case’ in which to test the public sector premium hypothesis: if 
work experience in the public sector does not have positive career consequences for government 
affairs managers, who work in the intersection between the public and the private sector, it is 
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unlikely that a public sector premium can be found for other jobs. Moreover, the European Union 
itself is an interesting case from a public and private management perspective.. 
The findings show that work experience in the public and non-profit sector has negative effects on 
the career progression of managers – these managers tend to progress less in the company -and 
that these effects become stronger when sector switching is recent. As such, this article partially 
disconfirms the expectations of the private and public management literatures. The analysis shows 
that sector switching at earlier stages is better than (or more specifically, not as bad as) at later 
stages. Nonetheless, overall, sector switching has negative effects on career progression. Managers 
with work experience in other sectors tend to progress less in the current company. This in turn 
suggests that we should see less revolving doors in Brussels than Washington. We put forward a 
tentative explanation for these findings, which look at how specific business and government 
relations affect the private and organizational incentives for career switching in place in the EU 
business and government relations 
Sector Switching in Public and Private Management 
An emerging body of work in public management has recently shifted attention to sector switching, 
in order to gain insight on the interaction between the public and the private sectors. The so-called 
sector switcher research agenda (Bozeman & Ponomariov, 2009) studies those individuals who 
switch from the private to the public sector and how their careers progress.  
This research agenda finds that public managers with work experience in the private sector 
progress more in their careers than those with none. In other words, there is a private sector 
premium in place in the public sector (Bozeman & Ponomariov, 2009). The logic behind this 
dynamic is mainly that sector switching is usually pursued by talented and motivated individuals, 
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with highly transferrable skills (Boardman, Bozeman, & Ponomariov, 2010; Feeney & Boardman, 
2011). Furthermore, the public management literature also finds that this private sector premium 
is stronger when the work experience in the private sector is at the earlier stages of the manager’s 
career. The reason is that individuals need time to adapt their skills to the public sector (Bozeman 
& Ponomariov, 2009). 
The literature on private management started to focus on job mobility in the 1980s, as a 
consequence of the organizational reforms business underwent in those years and the emergence 
of so-called boundaryless careers (Arthur, Khapova, & Wilderom, 2005; Arthur & Rousseau, 
2001; Sullivan & Arthur, 2006). In the 1980s, two main phenomena concerned white-collar 
workers in companies around the world: downsizing and delayering, respectively the reduction of 
the workforce and the flattening of hierarchies (Hassard, Morris, & McCann, 2012). One of the 
major consequences was a drastic change in career patterns. Since the 1980s, traditional career 
ladders inside companies started to be replaced by more flexible career patterns, characterised by 
high job mobility (Sullivan, 1999; Sullivan & Arthur, 2006).  
The private management literature has recently moved the attention to the consequences of this 
increasing mobility (Arthur et al., 2005; Brett & Stroh, 1997; Dreher & Cox, 2000). By building 
on the boundaryless career theory, some work posits that those individuals who experience high 
mobility have greater career opportunities (Sullivan & Arthur, 2006). Moreover, by building on 
traditional sociological theories, such as the human (Becker, 2009) and social capital theories 
(Burt, 1997; Granovetter, 1973), Lam et al. (2012) suggest that individuals who experience 
external mobility, namely who have work experience in different environments, tend to have 
highly transferrable skills and hence are appealing to companies. 
5 
 
Close in spirit to the public management strand, the private management literature also focuses on 
the timing of job mobility and its career consequences. Lam et al. (2012) find that external mobility 
(i.e. a phenomenon which refers generally to mobility outside a firm, regardless of whether in the 
same sector or not) at the beginning of the career is associated with higher salary than at later 
stages (Lam et al., 2012). In so doing, they rely on traditional career theories, such as the career 
stage (Super, 1980), the career timetable (Lawrence, 1988) and the anchor theories (Schein, 1974, 
1996). More specifically, they build on the notion that individuals go through several career stages, 
such as the early stages, where the individual explores and experiments different jobs, and the later 
stages, where the individual maintains his/her position (Super, 1980). In turn, this rests on social 
norms regarding career behaviours (Lawrence, 1988), such as that early-career workers are 
expected to show more mobility than late-career workers. This is also supported by the anchor 
theory (Schein, 1990), which argues that the worker becomes increasingly anchored to his/her 
work environment and hence, mobility comes at greater costs at later stages of the career. 
In conclusion, public and private management scholars find that sector switching, and job mobility 
in general, pays off in some ways. Yet, they find that only sector switching in the early stages of 
the individual’s career pays off.  
Sector Switching and Career Progression in Brussels 
In this work we test the public sector premium hypothesis, which is derived primarily from the 
US, in the context of the EU. In so doing, we implicitly draw a comparison between these two 
polities. Although there are some similarities, such as the presence of a strong supranational level 
drawing actors to the center, in this work we seek to test whether different political institutions and 
in turn different business and government dynamics (Coen & Vannoni, 2018) lead to different 
dynamics for sector switching and career progression.  
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US scholars posit that switching take place because business and government relations are driven 
by the importance of personal contacts (Bertrand, Bombardini, & Trebbi, 2011; Blanes i Vidal, 
Draca, & Fons-Rosen, 2012; Cain & Drutman, 2014; LaPira & Thomas, 2014; Lazarus, McKay, 
& Herbel, 2016; Lazarus & McKay, 2012). As such, companies hire individuals with experience 
in the public sector because they can provide access to government, thanks to their personal 
contacts. More recent work suggests that work experience in government provides the manager 
with inside knowledge of how the government works (LaPira & Thomas, 2017). In an increasingly 
uncertain and polarized political environment, these managers are a valuable resource for the firm 
(LaPira & Thomas, 2017). Moreover, the difference in salary and career prospects between the 
private and the public sector strongly affect the individual incentives to join the private sector 
(Blanes i Vidal et al., 2012; Cain & Drutman, 2014). In conclusion, in the US business and 
government relations individual and organizational incentives encourage managers to switch from 
the public to the private sector and companies to reward them. This is at the very core of the 
concept of revolving doors. 
Business and government relations in the European Union are rather different and lead to different 
individual and organizational incentives with respect to sector switching. As for the organizational 
incentives, in the European Union companies provide the public authority with technical expertise, 
in exchange of access to policy-making (Bouwen, 2002, 2004; Coen, 2007; Coen & Vannoni, 
2016, 2018). Moreover, the political environment is less polarized and competitive than the 
American one (LaPira & Thomas, 2017; Mahoney, 2008). As such, companies need managers 
with technical knowledge of the core competences of the sector and hence tend to hire individuals 
with work experience in the private sector.  
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As for the individual incentives, European Union officials have permanent contracts, with good 
benefits, which make employment in the public sector as attractive as that in the private sector.1 In 
the context of the EU, we note that the European institutions officials have less incentive to switch 
than their counterparts in Washington, as they are not politically appointed on fixed term contracts. 
Rather, they are career civil servants who have opted for a career in the EU, as many as 55 per cent 
actually switching from the private sector (Connolly & Kassim, 2016), who are well paid, have 
strong public sector motivations (Hooghe, 1999; Kassim et al., 2013). Moreover, there is limited 
mobility within the EU institutions with officials remaining for long periods in specific Director 
Generals (DGs) and that they often have high degrees of discretion as to who consult with along 
the policy cycle (Bauer, 2009; Kassim et al., 2013).  Finally, while we see some mobility between 
the national and the EU institutions civil service, that may create interesting tension between 
different national management cultures and the European, it has limited impact the EU 
public/private career progression (Trondel, Murdoch and Geys 2015).  
In conclusion, the literature on the EU suggests that in Brussels individuals are not incentivised to 
move from the public to the private sector and companies are not incentivised to reward sector 
switching. Below we put to the test these claims, but looking at whether sector switching leads to 
career progression in government affairs in Brussels. 
Research Design 
This article tests whether sector switching has positive career consequences for government affairs 
managers working in private companies politically active in the European Union. As government 
                                                             
1 Job mobility and sector switching in particular might still be attractive to some individuals. For instance, the private sector has a 
more flexible occupational structure, which might be attractive to some. Yet, we argue that overall, incentives at individual and 
organizational level go against switching. 
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affairs managers work in the intersection between different sectors, the public and the private ones, 
they represent a particularly interesting case to study sector switching and by extension public and 
private management. Indeed, if, in the words of Bozeman and Ponomariov (2009) (p.77-78), ‘the 
“sector switcher” is the drosophila or the Arabidopsis of the management research world — the 
peculiar species that has just the robust “genetic makeup” we need to understand the phenomena 
we study’, then government affairs are the ‘drosophila’ or ‘Arabidopsis’ of sector switching.  
The analysis relies on a unique dataset which contains information on the government affairs 
managers (or in-house lobbyists), namely those individuals in charge of influencing the public 
policy, working in companies politically active in the European Union in the past ten years. The 
first step in the construction of this dataset was the identification of a sample of companies 
politically active in Brussels. For this purpose, throughout 2014 and 2015, observations were 
gathered from public and private directories (CEC, 2014; DODs, 2014; EA, 2006, 2007, 2008a, 
2008b), as well as other authors’ datasets (Wonka, Baumgartner, Mahoney, & Berkhout, 2010). 
The resulting sample consists of 512 public and private companies, based in 32 countries and 13 
sectors, which range from a few to hundreds of thousands of employees in size. Then, information 
was gathered on the government affairs managers working for those companies, using the public 
and private directories mentioned above (CEC, 2014; DODs, 2014), professional social networks, 
such as LinkedIn, corporate websites and public affairs/business websites. For instance, in the EU 
Joint Transparency Register we gathered this information from the section ‘Person in charge of 
EU Relations’.  Information was gathered on their current role and their previous occupations. The 
final dataset contains 325 government affairs managers. 
This dataset represents a ‘snapshot’ of the managers politically representing companies in Brussels 
at the time of data gathering. As such, this sample includes individuals who have just become in 
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charge of EU relations and others who have been in that position for a longer period. As discussed 
below, in the type of analysis used in this work this aspect is very important. Also, it should be 
noted that, as the sample is composed of individuals in similar job positions and with similar 
profiles, the analysis partially controls for other factors which might affect switching behaviours, 
but for which information is unavailable, such as managers’ age.  
The dependent variable is ‘career progression’, measured by looking at whether the manager 
moves from the first job in the current company to the second job, always in the same company, 
and the timing of this transition, namely the time spent in the first job. We measure progression as 
job mobility inside the company. First, we focus on job mobility inside the company because inter-
firm mobility is affected by complex dynamics at individual level which are not easily captured in 
an empirical analysis. For instance, an individual might opt for moving to another company at a 
lower occupation level and/or a lower wage, if the probability of future progression and/or a good 
salary is higher (Sicherman & Galor, 1990).  
Second, we measure career progression by looking at the title of the job. Although this measure is 
common in the literature (Ransom & Oaxaca, 2005), it does not include a series of other benefits, 
such as an increase in wage or a broadening of the task portfolio, which are important, but for 
which information is not available. In other words, we measure career progression with a change 
in occupation, more specifically job title, within the same firm. This is an imperfect measure of 
career progression (or ‘promotion’). Indeed, it might be that a change in job title is a horizontal 
movement, or even a downward movement. In their theoretical model of career mobility, 
Sicherman and Galor (1990) find that the probability of promotion from occupation A to 
occupation B is a function of the level of human capital obtained in school, that obtained in 
occupation A and ability. In turn, the level of human capital obtained in occupation A is an 
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increasing function of education, ability and time spent in the occupation A. Although ability is a 
latent variable, in the dataset used in this work we have information on the time spent in the first 
position in a company and the level of education of the managers. If we find that these two factors 
are positively associated with the likelihood of changing job title, this suggests that our measure 
is a valid proxy of career progression. Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3, which are discussed below, 
provide evidence for this positive relation.  
Third, we look at the first instance of career progression, which is arguably the most likely to be 
affected by previous work experience. Also, the dynamics behind the first ‘promotion’ are more 
straightforward, as the longer the career path in the company is and the higher is the discount factor 
for the individual. In other words, there are firm-specific investments which makes intra-firm 
mobility more likely than inter-firm mobility over time (Sicherman & Galor, 1990). 
Finally, we rely on self-reported information, which might be problematic. The literature on 
private management acknowledges the interaction between subjective and objective career success 
(Arthur & Rousseau, 2001; Feldman & Ng, 2007; Sullivan & Arthur, 2006). A review of the 
studies of career success shows that these two notions are both equally used in the private 
management literature, as they are theoretically and empirically entangled (Arthur et al., 2005). In 
other words, the individual’s evaluation of his/her own career and more objective indicators, such 
as task attributes, responsibilities and job level, are highly correlated. The main source of 
information on career progression in this study, namely LinkedIn, relies on self-reported 
information, which can be associated with a subjective conception of career progression. Yet, in 
comparison to surveys, which are common practice in the public management literature, the 
information provided through professional social networks, such as LinkedIn, is publicly available 
and subject to the scrutiny of hundreds of people, such as colleagues. It might be argued that when 
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individuals provide information on their career progression through professional social networks, 
they also take into consideration their colleagues’ perceptions on career progression. As such, 
information drawn from these sources arguably combines both the objective and subjective career 
notions. Information on the time passed between when the manager entered the company and 
his/her first career move or the time spent in the current position in the case of censored 
observations is available for 309 managers.2  
The work experience of the manager before entering his/her current company is coded into public, 
private and nonprofit sectors. The category ‘public sector’ includes jobs in European institutions, 
other international (governmental) organizations, national and sub-national authorities. ‘Private 
sector’ and ‘nonprofit sector’ refer respectively to work experience in other companies and in 
research centres, universities and (national and international) non-governmental organizations.3 
Moreover, in order to test whether the timing of sector switching is relevant, different codes are 
used for whether the manager has work experience in the public sector (also) in later stages of 
his/her careers or he/she has work experience in the public sector (only) in earlier stages. 
Information on managers’ professional background (outside the current company) is available for 
250 observations. 
Finally, managers’ individual characteristics, such as gender and education, and factors at 
company level, such as size, industry and country, gathered from the dataset Amadeus 
(BureauVanDijk, 2014), are included in the analysis. 4 These factors might be relevant, as both the 
public and the private management strands of literature emphasise the difference in the workforce 
                                                             
2 Censoring is discussed in detail below. 
3 For instance, LinkedIn provides information for up to six previous occupations. 
4 The tables in the appendix provide information on the source and operationalization of variables, along with descriptive statistics. 
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composition between the public and the private sectors and how this affects sector switching (Su 
& Bozeman, 2009). For instance, great attention is paid to how gender affects career progression 
(Birgit, 2007; Linehan, Scullion, & Walsh, 2001). Moreover, these two strands suggest that 
different management cultures are present across different industries and countries (Barron, 2011; 
Baysinger, Keim, & Zeithaml, 1985; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hofstede, 1984; Hofstede & Bond, 
1988; Nigro & Meier, 1975).  
The method used to analyse the data is event history analysis. This method is used to analyse data 
where the outcome is whether an event occurs, in this case career progression, and the time until 
the occurrence. It should be noted that survival analysis, how event history analysis is called in 
natural sciences, was first used to study the effects of medical treatments on patients. The event 
under study in traditional studies using this method is usually death or illness relapse. Hence, the 
terminology associated with this method is rather negative in tone, with terms like ‘risk’ and 
‘hazard’.  
 Although several other methods are present to analyse career data (Vannoni & John, 2018), event 
history analysis is the most suitable to study the likelihood that the individual will transition to a 
career stage. This method has already been used both in public and private management (Choi, 
Feiock, & Bae, 2013; Iverson & Pullman, 2000; Su & Bozeman, 2009; Thom, 2013). For instance, 
Su and Bozeman (2009) study the likelihood of switching sectors using this approach. 
Here, we use the Cox proportional hazards model to determine the association between individual 
and company level factors and the ‘risk’ of career progression. We use this model because it is the 
most flexible one in terms of assumptions. In calculating the risk of an event to happen, the Cox 
model takes into consideration the occurrence and the duration of that event (Allison, 1984; Box-
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Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004), in this case whether the manager progresses in his/her career and 
how long it takes.  The model is the following: 
ℎ(𝑡|𝑥𝑗) = ℎ0(𝑡) 𝑒
(𝑥𝑗𝛽) 
 
First, ℎ(𝑡|𝑥𝑗) is the hazard rate of career progression at time 𝑡 given the combination of the 
covariates used in the model, which is 𝑥𝑗. Second, ℎ0(𝑡) represents the baseline hazard function 
when the covariates equal zero. Third, 𝛽 is the effect of the covariates on the dependent variable. 
The interpretation of the coefficient 𝛽 for the covariates of interest, namely work experience in the 
public or nonprofit sector, is the following. If the coefficient 𝛽 is negative, a negative association 
is present between work experience in the public or nonprofit sector and the risk of career 
progression. As for the substantive interpretation, managers with experience in public or nonprofit 
sector have a hazard rate that is (1 −  𝑒(𝛽))  smaller than the hazard rate of those without. 
Conversely, if the coefficient 𝛽 is positive, then a positive association is present between 
experience in the public or nonprofit sector and the likelihood of career progression. As for the 
substantive interpretation, managers with experience in the public or nonprofit sector have a hazard 
rate that is (𝑒(𝛽) − 1) greater than the hazard rate of those without. 
It should be noted that there are observations for which the managers have not progressed in the 
company at the time of measurement, namely those managers who jumped directly from a job 
elsewhere to government affairs managers in the current company. This is called censoring. In this 
case, the observation is coded as zero and the time is coded as the time spent in the current position 
until the measurement takes place. In event history analysis, censoring is rather common and it is 
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not problematic, as long as it is non-informative (Allison, 1984). In the case under analysis, this 
means that the probability of a manager to be considered censored should not be related to the risk 
of career progression of this manager. In this analysis, censoring depends exclusively on the data 
collection process: only those managers who have not progressed when the information is collected 
are considered censored. It might be argued that those managers who are less likely to progress 
are also more likely to be measured as censored. This would be true if managers were observed 
over the same period of time, namely if the sample were balanced. Yet, in this study some 
managers are observed when they have just started working for the current company and others 
when they have been working there already for a long time. As such, it is reasonable to assume 
that censoring is unrelated to the likelihood of being promoted.  
The Cox model has a second key assumption: proportional hazards (Allison, 1984; Box-
Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004). This means that the relationship between the risk of an event 
occurring and time needs to be similar across different strata. In the specific case under analysis, 
this condition would be violated if female managers were more likely to progress in their careers 
over time and the opposite were true for male managers, for instance. Although this is an unlikely 
scenario, especially when the dependent variable is a phenomenon like career progression, which 
overall tends to be positively associated with time, this condition is tested below. Finally, it should 
be noted that factors at company level are plugged into the model as control variables, as the use 
of fixed effects in event history analysis is considered problematic (Allison, 2009; Allison & 
Christakis, 2006). 
Results 
Before showing the results of the Cox model, this section provides some descriptive statistics. 
Roughly 45 per cent of managers experience the event, namely career progression. Moreover, the 
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mean time for career progression is approximately six years. As for the independent variable of 
interest, namely managers’ work experience, 28 per cent of the managers have experience in the 
public sector, whereas 23 per cent have experience in the nonprofit sector. Only eight per cent 
have work experience both in the public and the nonprofit sector. These preliminary findings 
suggest that sector switching is not a common phenomenon, at least in comparison with the US 
revolving doors.  
The survival functions for those managers with work experience in the public sector and those 
without are shown in Figure 1. In Figure 1 time (in years in this case) is on the horizontal axis and 
the proportion of ‘surviving’ managers – those managers who have not progressed yet at a 
particular point in time – is on the vertical axis. The fact that both survival functions are negatively 
sloped means that in both cases the proportion of ‘surviving’ managers decreases over time. In 
other words, an increasing number of managers in the sample progress in their career over time. 
Yet, it should be noted that the proportion of surviving managers with experience in the public 
sector decreases less over time than the proportion of surviving managers without such experience, 
which means that fewer managers with public experience progress over time, with respect to those 
without such experience. This difference is statistically significant, with significance p < 0.05.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
In a similar vein, Figure 2 shows the survival functions for those managers with experience in the 
nonprofit sector and those without such experience. The results are very similar to those in Figure 
1: fewer managers with experience in the nonprofit sector progress in their career over time, with 
respect to those which do not experience sector switching. These preliminary findings already 
suggest that having work experience in the public or nonprofit sector might have negative career 
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consequences in the private sector, but other factors need to be controlled for in the analysis, before 
drawing conclusions. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Also, these findings suggest that the likelihood of career progression, as measured in this work 
with the first change in occupation (job title) in the current company, increases with time. This 
suggests that, as discussed above, this measure is a good proxy for career progression. Moreover, 
Figure 2 shows the survival functions for those managers with postgraduate education and those 
without. We find that education is positively correlated with our measure of career progression. 
As mentioned above, this suggests that our proxy is valid.  
Table 1 shows the results of the Cox proportional hazards model. As mentioned above, the sign of 
the coefficient reveals the direction of the association: a negative sign indicates a negative 
relationship between the covariate and the risk of career progression. Furthermore, in order to 
interpret coefficients, they need to be exponentiated. The results suggest a negative relationship 
between work experience in the public sector and the risk of progressing, with significance p<0.05, 
even when controlling for work experience in the nonprofit sector (Model 2), individual level 
factors (Model 3) and company level factors (Model 4 and Model 5). By looking at the coefficient 
in Model 5, it can be concluded that managers with work experience in the public sector are 42 per 
cent less at risk of progressing. Results also suggest a negative relationship between work 
experience in the nonprofit sector and the risk of career progression, with significance p<0.01, in 
the full model (Model 5). Moreover, managers with postgraduate education are more at risk of 
progressing in their career, whereas this relationship is negative for those managers working in 
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small companies. Interestingly, this study shows no significant effect of country and industry on 
career progression. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 shows the results of the Cox model which takes the timing of sector switching as main 
independent variable. Results show that there is a negative relationship between having experience 
in the public sector at later stages of the career and the risk of career progression with significance 
p<0.01. In this analysis, early experience in the public sector is taken as a reference category. This 
allows comparing the effect of late work experience in the public sector with the effect of early 
work experience. The analysis with no work experience in the public sector as reference category 
can be found in the Appendix. Also, no significant difference is present between having early 
experience in the public sector and having none. By looking at the coefficient in Model 5, it can 
be concluded that managers with recent work experience in the public sector are 74 per cent less 
at risk of career progression than those with early experience. Work experience in the nonprofit 
sector remains statistically significant, with significance p<0.01, when individual and company 
factors are controlled for (Model 4 and Model 5). Differently from Table 1, the education of the 
manager and the size of the company are not statistically significant. 
 [Table 2 about here] 
Finally, Table 3 shows the results of the Cox model which takes the stage at which the manager 
had work experience in the nonprofit sector as main independent variable. The results show a 
negative relationship between work experience in the nonprofit sector in the later stages of career 
and career progression, also when controlling for variables at individual and company level, even 
though the statistical significance is borderline in Model 5. As above, earlier work experience is 
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taken as reference category. The analysis with no work experience in the nonprofit sector as 
reference category can be found in the Appendix. As in the case of work experience in the public 
sector, having early experience does not have any statistical effect. Work experience in the public 
sector remains statistically significant with significance p<0.05.  Results for control variables are 
similar to those in Table 2. Individual factors, other than work experience, are not statistically 
associated with career progression. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Before discussing the results, this section tests the proportionality of hazards, which represents a 
central assumption in the Cox proportional hazard model, as discussed above. First of all, it should 
be noted that the two functions in Figure 1 evolve similarly over time. This suggests that the 
predictor measuring work experience in the public sector satisfies the proportional hazard 
assumption. A formal test based on the Schoenfeld residuals, as it is common practice in Cox 
models, shows that the assumption holds for all the predictors. 
In conclusion, the results show a negative relationship between work experience in the public or 
nonprofit sectors and career progression in the private. Unsurprisingly, managers with 
postgraduate education are more likely to proceed in their careers in firms. Moreover, those in 
smaller firms will progress less. The negative relationship between work experience in the public 
and nonprofit sector and career progression becomes stronger when the stage at which that work 
experience occurred is taken into consideration. In fact, recent experience in the public and 
nonprofit sector has strong negative effects on career progression, whereas early experience does 
not have any significant effect. Finally, no variation is found across countries or industries and, 
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when the stage of the career is taken into consideration, also individual and company level 
covariates are not significant. 
To corroborate our findings, we provide a final piece of evidence showing that no public sector 
premium is present in our case and that, rather, having work experience in the public sector has 
negative effects on the career of the manager. We gather information on the position the manager 
currently holds in the company (at the time of analysis). More specifically, we measure whether 
the manager has an executive position or not. Executive positions are senior positions, such as 
(deputy managing, executive or senior) director and (senior) vice president, important for the 
management of the whole company and just below the president or the managing director. Table 
4 shows the results of a logistic regression with whether the manager holds an executive position 
as dependent variable and whether the manager has experience in the public sector before joining 
the company. As done for the other analyses, we control for a series of factors at individual, firm, 
industry and country level, which may affect careers in a company. It is reasonable to assume that 
the level of education of the individual, his/her gender, the size of the company, the industry in 
which the company operates and the country of origin might affect career dynamics. Results 
suggest that those managers with work experience in the public sector prior to joining the current 
company are less likely to hold an executive position. These results supports our findings above 
that no public sector premium is present in our case. 
Discussion  
The findings suggest that for European Union government affairs work experience in the public or 
non-profit sector has negative career consequences, and these negative career consequences 
become stronger when the work experience is in the later stages of the manager’s career. 
Furthermore, no difference is present across countries and industries. These findings provide 
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interesting puzzles for the literature. This suggests the presence of distinct dynamics in place, 
which calls for future research in the study of sector switching and, by extension, the interaction 
between the public and the private sector. 
A tentative explanation for this puzzling finding might lie in the individual and organizational 
incentives, determined by the specific business and government relations where the company acts. 
The individual incentives which drive managers to switch from the public to the private sector and 
the organizational incentives which drive business and government to hire these managers can 
explain the lack of a public sector premium found above. 
The European Union business and government relations in which companies act and the relative 
individual and organizational incentives might explain why switching from the public to the 
private sector does not pay off for government affairs, in terms of career progression. Yet, potential 
alternative explanations might also explain this finding. It might be argued, indeed, that individuals 
with a public sector background (particularly those who stayed in the public sector for long) might 
have a preference for less job mobility in first instance, as they have been socialized into job 
stability. Overall, mobility is higher in the private sector than in the public sector. It is reasonable 
to assume that also what the individual wants affect the dynamics studied above. Future research 
should look also at this aspect. Yet, if it is found that similar dynamics are in place for sector 
switching from the public sector and sector switching from the nonprofit sector, where job stability 
is as low as (if not lower than) in the private sector, it is reasonable to conclude that individual 
preferences for job mobility, which result from the work background of the individuals, matter less 
in the particular case under analysis. 
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Also, comparing individuals with recent work experience in the public sector with those with late 
experience allows controlling for another alternative explanation. It might be argued that high 
quality individuals are attracted to the private sector with a big promotion. Hence, the following 
promotion would take longer to arrive. In other words, it might be argued that the premium is in 
the promotion the manager gets as first job in the private sector. This mechanism might explain 
why although companies in the European Union value managers with experience in the public 
sector these managers progress less once they are in the private sector. This alternative explanation 
is difficult to disprove from an empirical perspective. Yet, in the analysis above we find a strong 
differential effect between those with recent and late work experience in the public. This finding 
is inconsistent with the alternative explanation discussed above. 
The alternative explanations based on how career progression may be influenced by individual 
preferences for job mobility, in turn dependent on past work experience, and by the level of the 
entry position in a company, related to past work experience as well, cannot explain the results in 
Table 4. The latter suggest that those managers with experience in the public sector prior to joining 
the current company are less likely to currently hold senior positions in the company. Although 
individual preferences for mobility and the level of the entry position in the company might affect 
career progression as we measure it above, namely with intra-firm mobility, it is unlikely that they 
affect the current job level of the managers. In conclusion, these two alternative explanations can 
be discarded. 
Another puzzling finding for the public management literature (and also for the private 
management strand) is the lack of variation in the association between sector switching and career 
progression across countries and industries. In fact, the public management literature suggests that 
sector switching is more common in certain sectors, such as highly regulated industries (Nigro & 
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Meier, 1975). Furthermore, even though the private management literature does not study 
specifically sector switching across industries, some work emphasises the importance of different 
management cultures and how this might affect the career of managers. Management cultures, as 
bodies of ideas, norms and beliefs socially transmitted (Hofstede, 1984), differ in several respects 
and one of these is the relationship with the public authority (Baysinger et al., 1985; Hillman & 
Hitt, 1999; Hofstede & Bond, 1988). Different ways to interact with the public sector, as embodied 
in different management cultures, have effects also at the individual level (Barron, 2011; Leung, 
Rabi, Buchan, Erez, & Gibson, 2005). As such, it is reasonable to assume that sector switching 
might be seen more positively in certain cases than others. 
The European Union represents an interesting case from the public management perspective, since 
European Union institutions, such as the European Commission, combine different national public 
management cultures, sometimes in strong opposition one another and with an emerging common 
public management culture at European level (Trondal, Murdoch, & Geys, 2015). The public 
management literature studies the establishment of an independent administration as a necessary 
condition for the autonomy of international organizations such as the EU (Olsen, 2010; Trondal & 
Peters, 2013). Recent work finds that a good portion of EU civil servants are seconded from 
national administrations and maintain strong links with the administration of origin (Trondal et al., 
2015). 5 Hence, from our perspective, we would expect variation in the career dynamics across 
different firms from different countries. 
The same holds true for the private management literature, as companies in the European Union 
maintain their national management cultures (Barron, 2011; Coen, 1997, 1998), but they are also 
                                                             
5 This is known as the ‘dependency problem’ in the public management of international organization (Ellinas & Suleiman, 2012). 
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subject to strong pressures to standardize their attitudes and behaviours, a phenomenon called 
Europeanization (Börzel & Risse, 2003; Coen & Dannreuther, 2003; Vannoni, 2015). The lack of 
variation in career progression dynamics across industries and firms’ countries of origins found 
above seems to suggest that the European private and public management dynamics prevail over 
the national ones. 
Conclusion 
This article presents an interesting case study for European public management studies by looking 
at the effects of sector switching on the career progression of government affairs managers in 
companies politically active in the Brussels. Findings suggest that sector switching does not pay 
off. In fact, moving from the public or the non-profit sector to the private has negative effects on 
career progression, especially if sector switching occurs at later career stages. This suggests a 
rather different scenario from the one depicted by the US public management and calls for more 
comparative research which looks at the role of individual and organizational incentives in 
different business and government environments.  
Moreover, the findings support the need for international public administration and international 
organization scholars to develop studies of business-government relations that take account of new 
behavioral logics based on different civil service motivations, career incentives and increasing 
bureaucratic authority   (Barnett & Finnemore, 2004; Knill & Bauer, 2016) . Significantly, our 
study contributes to this research agenda by showing the robustness of the EU public policy and 
business government relationships to internationalization, as our findings show little variation is 
present across countries origin and/or industries, suggesting that the European management culture 
prevails over the multinational culture and national origin. 
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The findings above elicit important implications for the study of revolving doors, central to 
political science and political economy. In the EU we have seen the emergence of a distinct 
business government arrangement, where influence is less about money, PACs, political contacts, 
party and presidential access (LaPira, & Thomas 2017), but rather an informational exchange 
based on technical expertise, credibility and long run reputation building (Coen 1997, 1999). 
Under these unique conditions specific business political capabilities have emerged (Coen and 
Vannoni 2018). In this paper, we find that there are organizational and individual incentives in 
government affairs in Brussels which prevent managers from switching sectors. This in turn 
suggest that we should see less revolving doors in the EU, in line with recent research in the field 
(Coen and Vannoni 2016). Future research should further develop this comparative research 
agenda and test the revolving doors argument in other contexts and especially in international 
organizations, such as the international financial institutions.  
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1 Survival Functions for Managers with Work Experience in the Public Sector and those 
with No Experience. 
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Figure 2 Survival Functions for Managers with Work Experience in the Nonprofit Sector and 
those with No Experience. 
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Figure 3 Survival Functions for Managers with Postgraduate Education and those with No 
Postgraduate Education. 
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Table 1 Cox Proportional Hazards Model: Risk of Career Progression and Sector Switching 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Public Experience -0.47** -0.48** -0.45** -0.52** -0.54** 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) 
No-profit Experience  -0.41* -0.52** -0.57** -0.63*** 
  (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) 
Gender - Male   -0.18 -0.15 -0.17 
   (0.22) (0.23) (0.24) 
Education - Postgraduate   0.43** 0.39* 0.44** 
   (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) 
Firm Size - Small    -0.54* -0.64* 
    (0.32) (0.33) 
Industry - Information    0.18 0.14 
    (0.48) (0.49) 
Industry - Manufacturing    0.17 0.10 
    (0.34) (0.34) 
Industry - Other    0.40 0.35 
    (0.34) (0.35) 
Industry - Professional    0.04 -0.10 
    (0.38) (0.39) 
Industry - Wholesale    0.19 0.13 
    (0.46) (0.46) 
Country - Continental     -0.15 
     (0.27) 
Country - Mediterranean     -0.36 
     (0.41) 
Country - non-European     -0.05 
     (0.34) 
Country - Scandinavian     0.61 
     (0.41) 
AIC 975.95 974.61 973.91 958.23 940.26 
R2 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 
Max. R2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Num. events 99 99 99 97 95 
Num. obs. 241 241 241 235 232 
Missings 84 84 84 90 93 
PH test 0.79 0.89 0.86 0.36 0.08 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
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Table 2 Cox Proportional Hazards Model: Risk of Career Progression and the Time of Switching 
from the Public Sector 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Public Experience - None -0.36 -0.40 -0.45 -0.37 -0.38 
 (0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.32) (0.33) 
Public Experience - Late -1.25*** -1.32*** -1.33*** -1.30*** -1.33*** 
 (0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.40) (0.41) 
No-profit Experience  -0.47** -0.59** -0.63*** -0.70*** 
  (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) 
Gender - Male   -0.27 -0.28 -0.29 
   (0.22) (0.24) (0.25) 
Education - Postgraduate   0.39* 0.38* 0.41* 
   (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) 
Firm Size - Small    -0.47 -0.54 
    (0.32) (0.34) 
Industry - Information    0.20 0.19 
    (0.48) (0.49) 
Industry - Manufacturing    0.04 -0.02 
    (0.34) (0.35) 
Industry - Other    0.37 0.33 
    (0.34) (0.35) 
Industry - Professional    0.03 -0.09 
    (0.38) (0.39) 
Industry - Wholesale    0.18 0.12 
    (0.46) (0.46) 
Country - Continental     -0.03 
     (0.27) 
Country - Mediterranean     -0.29 
     (0.42) 
Country - non-European     0.08 
     (0.34) 
Country - Scandinavian     0.73* 
     (0.42) 
AIC 968.25 965.86 965.17 950.34 932.11 
R2 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.13 
Max. R2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Num. events 99 99 99 97 95 
Num. obs. 241 241 241 235 232 
Missings 84 84 84 90 93 
PH test 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.43 0.11 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
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Table 3 Cox Proportional Hazards Model: Risk of Career Progression and the Time of Switching 
from the Nonprofit Sector 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
No-profit Experience - None -0.41 -0.34 -0.25 -0.17 -0.01 
 (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.41) (0.43) 
No-profit Experience - Late -1.00** -0.94** -0.96** -0.93** -0.80* 
 (0.45) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45) (0.46) 
Public Experience  -0.46** -0.43* -0.49** -0.51** 
  (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) 
Gender - Male   -0.18 -0.15 -0.16 
   (0.22) (0.24) (0.24) 
Education - Postgraduate   0.43** 0.39* 0.43* 
   (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) 
Firm Size - Small    -0.55* -0.61* 
    (0.32) (0.33) 
Industry - Information    0.19 0.14 
    (0.48) (0.49) 
Industry - Manufacturing    0.17 0.10 
    (0.34) (0.34) 
Industry - Other    0.36 0.30 
    (0.35) (0.35) 
Industry - Professional    0.02 -0.15 
    (0.38) (0.39) 
Industry - Wholesale    0.21 0.13 
    (0.46) (0.46) 
Country - Continental     -0.13 
     (0.27) 
Country - Mediterranean     -0.30 
     (0.42) 
Country - non-European     -0.03 
     (0.34) 
Country - Scandinavian     0.52 
     (0.42) 
AIC 975.22 972.86 971.95 956.53 939.63 
R2 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.10 
Max. R2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Num. events 99 99 99 97 95 
Num. obs. 241 241 241 235 232 
Missings 84 84 84 90 93 
PH test 0.66 0.86 0.85 0.39 0.11 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
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Table 4 Logistic Regression: Executive Position and Switching from the Public Sector 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Constant 0.35** 0.11 -0.75* -0.79 
 (0.16) (0.28) (0.45) (0.52) 
Public Experience -0.49* -0.52* -0.52* -0.49* 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.28) (0.29) 
Gender - Male  0.60** 0.68** 0.60* 
  (0.28) (0.30) (0.31) 
Education - Postgraduate  -0.29 -0.39 -0.38 
  (0.26) (0.27) (0.28) 
Firm Size - Small   0.41 0.48 
   (0.40) (0.41) 
Industry - Information   -0.42 -0.27 
   (0.63) (0.64) 
Industry - Manufacturing   1.14** 1.23*** 
   (0.45) (0.46) 
Industry - Other   0.70 0.77* 
   (0.45) (0.47) 
Industry - Professional   1.16** 1.27*** 
   (0.46) (0.48) 
Industry - Wholesale   1.25** 1.32** 
   (0.61) (0.62) 
Country - Continental    -0.02 
    (0.34) 
Country - Mediterranean    -0.33 
    (0.55) 
Country - non-European    0.18 
    (0.44) 
Country - Scandinavian    -0.57 
    (0.63) 
AIC 345.25 343.32 331.10 334.12 
BIC 352.29 357.40 366.07 382.91 
Log Likelihood -170.62 -167.66 -155.55 -153.06 
Deviance 341.25 335.32 311.10 306.12 
Num. obs. 250 250 244 241 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
Logistic Regression - Senior Position 
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Appendix 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Numerical Variables 
 Time 
Progress
ion 
Public 
Experience 
No-profit 
Experience Gender Education 
Firm 
Size 
Exec
utive 
Values 309 325 250 250 325 325 320 325 
Zero values 0 179 160 174 94 172 9 154 
NAs 16 0 75 75 0 0 5 0 
Min 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 30 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 
Range 29 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 
Sum 1782 146 90 76 231 153 881 171 
Median 4 0 0 0 1 0 3 1 
Mean 
5.766
99 
0.44923
1 0.36 0.304 
0.7107
69 0.470769 
2.753
125 
0.526
154 
SE 
0.255
795 
0.02763
4 0.030419 0.02915 
0.0251
89 0.02773 
0.037
493 
0.027
74 
CI 
0.503
327 
0.05436
5 0.059911 0.057412 
0.0495
55 0.054554 
0.073
765 
0.054
573 
Variance 
20.21
826 
0.24818
6 0.231325 0.212434 
0.2062
11 0.249915 
0.449
833 
0.250
085 
SD 
4.496
472 
0.49818
3 0.480963 0.460905 
0.4541
04 0.499915 
0.670
696 
0.500
085 
Coefficient 
of variation 
0.779
691 
1.10896
9 1.336008 1.516136 
0.6388
92 1.06191 
0.243
613 
0.950
455 
 
  
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Categorical Variables 
Industry Frequency 
Financial 45 
Information 27 
Manufacturing  88 
Other  64 
Professional 73 
Wholesale 24 
NA 4 
 
Country Frequency 
Anglo-Saxon 78 
Continental 135 
Mediterranean 26 
non-European 63 
Scandinavian 19 
NA 4 
 
Public 
Experience Time Frequency 
0           160 
Early 22 
Late 68 
NA 75 
 
No-profit 
Experience Time Frequency 
0           174 
Early 11 
Late 65 
NA 75 
 
  
Table 3 Source and Operationalization of Variables 
 Source Operationalization 
Time Professional social networks 
(e.g. LinkedIn), corporate 
websites and public 
affairs/business websites 
Time spent by the manager 
in the first job in the current 
company. If no progression, 
time spent by the manager in 
the current job at the time of 
measurement 
Progression Professional social networks 
(e.g. LinkedIn), corporate 
websites and public 
affairs/business websites 
Whether the manager moves 
from the first job in the 
current company to another 
job, always in the same 
company 
Executive Professional social networks 
(e.g. LinkedIn), corporate 
websites and public 
affairs/business websites 
Whether at the time of the 
analysis the manager holds 
an executive position, such 
as (deputy managing, 
executive or senior) director 
and (senior) vice president. 
Public Experience Professional social networks 
(e.g. LinkedIn), corporate 
websites and public 
affairs/business websites 
Whether the manager 
worked in European 
institutions, other 
international organizations, 
national and sub-national 
authorities (before joining 
the current company) 
No-profit Experience Professional social networks 
(e.g. LinkedIn), corporate 
websites and public 
affairs/business websites 
Whether the manager 
worked in research centres, 
universities and non-
governmental organizations 
(before joining the current 
company) 
Gender Professional social networks 
(e.g. LinkedIn), corporate 
websites and public 
affairs/business websites 
Whether the manager is 
male or female 
Education Professional social networks 
(e.g. LinkedIn), corporate 
websites and public 
affairs/business websites 
Whether the manager 
attended a post-graduate 
programme 
Firm Size Amadeus Bureau van Dijk Categories from the dataset 
Industry Amadeus Bureau van Dijk Categories from the dataset 
Country Amadeus Bureau van Dijk Non-European: Azerbaijan, 
China, Emirates, Japan, 
South Korea,  US; 
Scandinavian: Norway, 
Finland; Continental: 
Austria, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Poland, 
Slovakia,  Switzerland; 
Anglo-Saxon: UK, Ireland; 
Mediterranean: Italy, Spain, 
Greece 
Public Experience Time Professional social networks 
(e.g. LinkedIn), corporate 
websites and public 
affairs/business websites 
Whether the manager 
worked in the public sector 
also in the three jobs 
immediately before joining 
the current company (Late) 
or only in the previous ones 
(Early) 
No-profit Experience Time Professional social networks 
(e.g. LinkedIn), corporate 
websites and public 
affairs/business websites 
Whether the manager 
worked in the no-profit 
sector also in the three jobs 
immediately before joining 
the current company (Late) 
or only in the previous ones 
(Early) 
 
  
Table 4 Cox Proportional Hazards Model: Risk of Career Progression and the Time of Switching 
from the Public Sector (No Public Experience as Reference Category) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Public Experience - Early 0.36 0.40 0.45 0.37 0.38 
 (0.30) (0.30) (0.31) (0.32) (0.33) 
Public Experience - Late -0.89*** -0.92*** -0.88*** -0.93*** -0.96*** 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) 
No-profit Experience  -0.47** -0.59** -0.63*** -0.70*** 
  (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.25) 
Gender - Male   -0.27 -0.28 -0.29 
   (0.22) (0.24) (0.25) 
Education - Postgraduate   0.39* 0.38* 0.41* 
   (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) 
Firm Size - Small    -0.47 -0.54 
    (0.32) (0.34) 
Industry - Information    0.20 0.19 
    (0.48) (0.49) 
Industry - Manufacturing    0.04 -0.02 
    (0.34) (0.35) 
Industry - Other    0.37 0.33 
    (0.34) (0.35) 
Industry - Professional    0.03 -0.09 
    (0.38) (0.39) 
Industry - Wholesale    0.18 0.12 
    (0.46) (0.46) 
Country - Continental     -0.03 
     (0.27) 
Country - Mediterranean     -0.29 
     (0.42) 
Country - non-European     0.08 
     (0.34) 
Country - Scandinavian     0.73* 
     (0.42) 
AIC 968.25 965.86 965.17 950.34 932.11 
R2 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.13 
Max. R2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Num. events 99 99 99 97 95 
Num. obs. 241 241 241 235 232 
Missings 84 84 84 90 93 
PH test 0.91 0.91 0.90 0.43 0.11 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
Table 5 Cox Proportional Hazards Model: Risk of Career Progression and the Time of Switching 
from the Nonprofit Sector (No Nonprofit Experience as Reference Category) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
No-profit Experience - Early 0.41 0.34 0.25 0.17 0.01 
 (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.41) (0.43) 
No-profit Experience - Late -0.59** -0.60** -0.71*** -0.76*** -0.79*** 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) 
Public Experience  -0.46** -0.43* -0.49** -0.51** 
  (0.23) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) 
Gender - Male   -0.18 -0.15 -0.16 
   (0.22) (0.24) (0.24) 
Education - Postgraduate   0.43** 0.39* 0.43* 
   (0.21) (0.21) (0.22) 
Firm Size - Small    -0.55* -0.61* 
    (0.32) (0.33) 
Industry - Information    0.19 0.14 
    (0.48) (0.49) 
Industry - Manufacturing    0.17 0.10 
    (0.34) (0.34) 
Industry - Other    0.36 0.30 
    (0.35) (0.35) 
Industry - Professional    0.02 -0.15 
    (0.38) (0.39) 
Industry - Wholesale    0.21 0.13 
    (0.46) (0.46) 
Country - Continental     -0.13 
     (0.27) 
Country - Mediterranean     -0.30 
     (0.42) 
Country - non-European     -0.03 
     (0.34) 
Country - Scandinavian     0.52 
     (0.42) 
AIC 975.22 972.86 971.95 956.53 939.63 
R2 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.10 
Max. R2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Num. events 99 99 99 97 95 
Num. obs. 241 241 241 235 232 
Missings 84 84 84 90 93 
PH test 0.66 0.86 0.85 0.39 0.11 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1 
 
